UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-27-2017

State v. Bullock Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44515

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bullock Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44515" (2017). Not Reported. 3586.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3586

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 44515
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Ada County Case No.
v.
) CR-FE-2015-13907
)
LEVIE RAYMOND BULLOCK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................ 5
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6
I.

II.

The State Presented Substantial, Competent
Evidence To Support Bullock’s Robbery Conviction ....................... 6
A.

Introduction .......................................................................... 6

B.

Standard Of Review ............................................................. 6

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence
To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
That Bullock Intended To Aid And Abet
Robbery ................................................................................ 7

Bullock Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
In The Jury Instructions ................................................................. 12
A.

Introduction ........................................................................ 12

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................... 12

C.

Bullock Has Failed To Show Error, Much
Less Fundamental Error, In The Jury
Instructions ......................................................................... 13

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012) ............................... 12, 13
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................ 9
State v. Belue, 127 Idaho 464, 902 P.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1995) ....................... 8, 10
State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 90 P.3d 920 (Ct. App. 2004) ............................... 15
State v. Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 12 P.3d 382 (Ct. App. 2000) ......................... 7
State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 735 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987) .............................. 7
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) ..................................... 12
State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639, 181 P.3d 1247 (Ct. App. 2008) ......................... 11
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) ......................... 7
State v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 283 P.3d 107 (Ct. App. 2011) ............................. 6
State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 484, 988 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1999) ................... 8, 13
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1997) .......................... 6, 7
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 195 P.3d 737 (Ct. App. 2008) ...................... 7, 9
State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968) .......................................... 9
State v. Olin, 111 Idaho 516, 725 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1986) ................................ 8
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) .................................... 12, 13
State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990) ..................................... 7
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 253 P.3d 754 (Ct. App. 2011) ............. 14, 16, 17, 18
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................ 6
State v. Rivas, 129 Idaho 20, 921 P.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................ 7, 8
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003) ........ 7, 13

ii

State v. Ruel, 141 Idaho 600, 114 P.3d 158 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................. 14
State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985) ................. 8, 15, 16, 17
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ............................. 12, 15
STATUTES
I.C. § 18-204 ................................................................................................... 7, 13
I.C. § 18-6501 ................................................................................................. 8, 13
I.C. § 19-2132 ..................................................................................................... 15
OTHER AUTHORITIES
ICJI 311 ........................................................................................................ 13, 14
ICJI 312 ....................................................................................................... passim

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Levie Raymond Bullock appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of robbery.

On appeal, Bullock challenges the

sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction. Alternatively, he argues for the
first time on appeal that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding
the mental state necessary for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In the early morning hours of June 24, 2015, Bullock accompanied
Brandee Moseby, Devin Elmore, Amber Lopez, and at least one other individual
to the home of Zachary Wall. (Tr., p.180, L.3 – p.183, L.2; p.217, L.23 – p.218,
L.14; State’s Exhibit 1.)

Zachary, Jennifer Logan (Zachary’s then fiancée),

Michael Osborn, Maritschka Bleau, and Jennifer’s five-year-old son were all at
Zachary’s apartment when Bullock and his companions arrived. (Tr., p.180, L.3
– p.183, L.15.) At the time, Zachary was “in and out of a seizure” as a result of
having used methamphetamine. (Tr., p.172, Ls.8-16, p.182, Ls.7-19.) Jennifer
had also used methamphetamine and was “attending to Zachary” when she
heard a knock on the door.

(Tr., p.181, L.5 – p.182, L.21, p.190, Ls.4-20.)

Jennifer looked out the window to see who it was and recognized Brandee and
Devin.

(Tr., p.182, L.7 – p.183, L.4.)

Against Jennifer’s and Maritschka’s

instructions, Michael opened the door and let Bullock and his companions inside.
(Tr., p.182, L.25 – p.183, L.15.)
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After entering the apartment, Brandee, Amber, and Devin said that “their
house had just been robbed,” and they “asked permission to search” the
apartment for their belongings. (Tr., p.183, L.23 – p.184, L.19.) Jennifer “gave
them permission to do that,” at which point Brandee, Amber, Devin, and Bullock
all “start[ed] going through [Zachary’s and Jennifer’s] things.” (Tr., p.184, L.18 –
p.185, L.2.) At some point during the encounter, Bullock got a clothes hamper
and “loaded” it with several of Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings, including an
X-Box 360, a DVD player, and multiple phones. (Tr., p.186, L.5 – p.187, L.18.)
Jennifer told Bullock and the others not to take her things, but she did not do
more to stop them because “[t]he first time that [she] got up to say something,”
Devin “grabbed” her, “slammed [her] against the wall,” and “told [her] to sit down
and shut up.” (Tr., p.187, L.19 – p.188, L.2.) Devin had a handgun tucked in the
waistband of his pants, and he and Brandee and Amber threatened to harm
Jennifer and Zachary if they went “to the P.O.’s or the cops.” (Tr., p.185, L.3 –
p.186, L.3.) Bullock and his companions eventually left the apartment “as a
group” and “load[ed] up everything into the vehicle.” (Tr., p.186, Ls.10-14.)
In an interview with the police several weeks later, Bullock admitted he
was with Brandee and Devin when they went to Zachary’s house and took
Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings, but he denied having willingly participated
in the robberies. (State’s Exhibit 1.) According to Bullock, before they went to
Zachary’s apartment, Brandee and Devin and two other individuals showed up at
Bullock’s house and accused Amber and him of stealing from them. (Id. at 1:001:50, 4:00-4:15, 9:45-9:55.) Bullock said Devin was a member of the “SVC”
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gang and that he was “aggressive” with Bullock and Amber; he looked through
Bullock’s “stuff,” showed Bullock and Amber his gun, and sprayed “bug spray” in
Amber’s face. (Id. at 1:53-2:00, 3:13-3:20, 9:55-10:15, 11:05-11:35.) Bullock
said Brandee and Devin “forced” Amber and him to go to Zachary’s house. (Id.
at 4:00-5:13, 9:55-10:15.) Bullock claimed Brandee was the one who loaded
Zachary’s and Jennifer’s belongings into a laundry hamper and that “the only
thing that [he] did” was lift a board to access the crawl space. (Id. at 2:01-2:42,
5:15-5:50.)

According to Bullock, he and Amber left Zachary’s house while

Brandee and Devin were still there. (Id. at 6:05-6:20.)
The state charged Bullock with four counts of robbery but dismissed two
of the counts before trial. (R., pp.52-54, 72, 97.) As to the remaining charges,
the state proceeded on a theory that Bullock aided and abetted the robberies of
Zachary Wall (Count I) and Jennifer Logan (Count III). (R., pp.141-144; Tr.,
p.142, L.14 – p.145, L.19, p.237, L.14 – p.245, L.8, p.250, L.2 – p.252, L.6.)
Consistent with the statements he had made to police, Bullock testified at trial
that he was an unwilling participant in the robberies. (Tr., p.213, L.12 – p.224,
L.25.) During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court the following question:
“What is the dictionary’s definition of ‘abetted’[?]” (R., p.157.) With the parties’
consent, and consistent with the aiding and abetting instructions it had already
given, the trial court responded: “To abet another to commit a crime is to
command, procure, counsel, encourage, induce, or assist.” (R., p.157; see also
R., pp.141-42, 44 (elements and aiding and abetting instructions).) Ultimately,
the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the robbery of Zachary alleged in
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Count I, but it found Bullock guilty of the robbery of Jennifer alleged in Count III.
(R., pp.158-59.)

The state thereafter dismissed Count I, and the trial court

entered a Judgment of Conviction on Count III and sentenced Bullock to a
unified term of 10 years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.160-61, 163-64, 168-71.)
Bullock timely appealed. (R., pp.177-79, 185-89.)
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ISSUES
Bullock states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bullock’s robbery
conviction?

2.

Was the jury properly instructed on the mental state
necessary for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Did the state present substantial, competent evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bullock was guilty of robbery?

2.

Has Bullock failed to show the trial court committed fundamental error in
its jury instructions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence To Support Bullock’s
Robbery Conviction
A.

Introduction
Bullock challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for aiding and abetting robbery.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-12.)

Specifically, Bullock argues that, “[o]n the evidence presented at trial, no rational
trier of fact could have found that Mr. Bullock shared the criminal intent of [the
principals] and that there was a community of purpose in the robbery of Jennifer
Logan.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Bullock’s argument fails. A review of the trial
record shows the state presented substantial, competent evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bullock had the requisite intent to aid and abet
robbery.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.” State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes,
121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences
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to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding
the jury’s verdict.

Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart,

112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).
C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt That Bullock Intended To Aid And Abet Robbery
“An individual who participates in or assists the commission of an offense

is guilty of aiding and abetting the crime.” State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho
199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Gonzalez,
134 Idaho 907, 909, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (Ct. App. 2000)); see also I.C. § 18-204
(“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, … whether they directly
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission, … are
principals in any crime so committed.”). Mere knowledge of a crime or assent or
acquiescence in its commission does not create accomplice liability through
aiding and abetting. State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383, 195 P.3d 737, 742
(Ct. App. 2008).

Rather, “[a]iding and abetting requires some proof that the

accused either participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled
the crime.” State v. Rivas, 129 Idaho 20, 24, 921 P.2d 197, 201 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citing State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990)). “The
mental state required is generally the same as that required for the underlying
offense—the aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and
there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” Romero-
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Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214 (citing State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho
380, 386, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1985)).
In this case, the jury found Bullock guilty of aiding and abetting the
robbery of Jennifer Logan. (R., pp.142, 159.) Robbery is a specific intent crime;
it “requires the intent to both take the victim’s property by use of force or fear and
to permanently deprive the victim of the property.” State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho
484, 487, 988 P.2d 710, 713 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Belue, 127 Idaho
464, 466, 902 P.2d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1995)); see also I.C. § 18-6501 (defining
robbery as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear); State v. Olin, 111 Idaho 516, 518-19,
725 P.2d 801, 803-04 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, to sustain Bullock’s conviction for
aiding and abetting robbery, the state was required to prove that Bullock
“participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled” the robbery of
Jennifer Logan, Rivas, 129 Idaho at 24, 921 P.2d at 201, and that he did so with
the intent both to take Jennifer’s property by use of force or fear and to
permanently deprive her of her property, Martinez, 133 Idaho at 487, 988 P.2d at
713. Contrary to Bullock’s assertions on appeal, a review of the trial record
shows the state met its burden.
Jennifer testified that Bullock was one of several individuals who
“show[ed] up,” “uninvited,” at her home in the middle of the night. (Tr., p.182, L.7
– p.183, L.22.)

After Jennifer gave the group “permission to search [the]

residence to see if their belongings were there,” Bullock and the others “start[ed]
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going through [Jennifer’s and Zachary Wall’s] things,” and Bullock loaded a
number of Jennifer’s and Zachary’s belongings into a laundry hamper.
p.183, L.18 – p.187, L.18.)

(Tr.,

Although Bullock was not armed, one of his

companions, Devin Elmore, had a handgun visibly tucked in the waistband of his
pants. (Tr., p.185, Ls.3-19.) When Jennifer told Bullock and the others not to
take her things, Devin “slammed [her] against the wall” and “told [her] to sit down
and shut up.” (Tr., p.187, L.22 – p.188, L.2.) Devin and Brandee and Amber
also threatened to harm Jennifer and Zachary if they reported the incident to
police. (Tr., p.185, L.20 – p.186, L.4.) While participating in the robbery, Bullock
did what his companions told him to do, but he did not look scared. (Tr., p.186,
L.5 – p.187, L.6, p.194, L.22 – p.195, L.4.) Ultimately, he and his companions
left Jennifer’s and Zachary’s apartment “as a group” and “load[ed] up everything”
they had taken from the apartment into a vehicle. (Tr., p.188, Ls.10-14.)
Construing the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
facts in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, the foregoing evidence was sufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bullock had the intent necessary to
sustain his conviction for robbery. As Bullock acknowledges on appeal (see
Appellant’s brief, p.11), “direct evidence of intent is not required.

It may be

shown by circumstantial evidence, or proven by the defendant’s acts and
conduct.” Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 384, 195 P.3d at 743; see also State v. Oldham,
92 Idaho 124, 132, 438 P.2d 275, 283 (1968) (“Specific intent may, and
ordinarily must, be proved by circumstantial evidence.” (citations omitted)); State
v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 573, 181 P.3d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Criminal
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intent can be inferred from the commission of acts and the surrounding
circumstances.” (citations omitted)); Belue, 127 Idaho at 467, 902 P.2d at 492
(same). Evidence that Bullock accompanied several individuals, one of whom
was armed, into Jennifer’s house in the middle of the night, searched through
her things, loaded her property into a laundry hamper, and left the house with her
property and with the people who had threatened to harm her if she reported the
incident to the police was evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer
that Bullock actively participated in the robbery with the specific intent to take
Jennifer’s property by use of force or fear and to permanently deprive her of the
property taken.
In arguing that the state failed to meet its burden of proving the mental
state element necessary to convict him of aiding and abetting robbery, Bullock
argues the “role” he “played in the robbery” was “extremely limited” and “simply
cannot support an inference that he shared in [the principals’] criminal intent to
take personal property from Jennifer, and that there was a community of purpose
in such undertaking.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)

To support this argument,

counsel for Bullock makes the following representation: “She [Jennifer] testified
that Mr. Bullock ‘was just listening to what was being told to him’ and did not act
on his own volition.” (Appellant’s brief, p.11 (citing Tr., p.187, Ls.1-4).)

This

representation is only partially accurate. When asked by the prosecutor whether
Bullock was “interacting with Brandee Moseby and Devin Elmore during” the time
that Bullock was loading Jennifer’s and Zachary’s personal belongings into the
hamper, Jennifer did testify, “He was just listening to what was being told to him.”
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(Tr., p.186, L.5 – p.187, L.4.) Contrary to Bullock’s assertion, however, Jennifer
never testified that Bullock “did not act on his own volition.”

Nor does the

evidence, viewed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, mandate such a
conclusion.
Evidence that, during the robbery, Bullock “was just listening to what was
being told to him,” and even that he followed one or more of the principal’s
instructions regarding what items of property to take and retain (see Tr., p.194,
L.22 – p.195, L.4), is not inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Bullock
participated in the robbery with the requisite intent to take Jennifer’s property by
the use of force or fear and to permanently deprive her of the property. Nor was
the jury required to believe Bullock’s self-serving testimony that he was an
unwilling participant in the robbery. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639,
641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Credibility determinations are within
the province of the jury.”). Bullock may not have been the ring-leader of the
operation, but evidence that he assisted the principals in taking Jennifer’s
property by the use of force and fear and that he, along with the principals,
removed the property from Jennifer’s apartment was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could conclude that Bullock had the requisite intent to aid and abet
the robbery. Bullock’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.
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II.
Bullock Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Bullock argues the trial court failed to

“properly instruct the jury on the mental state necessary for robbery under an
aiding/abetting theory.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-16.) A review of the record and
of the applicable law shows that Bullock has failed to demonstrate error, much
less fundamental error, in the challenged instructions.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d
414, 430 (2009). “An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the
instruction.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the instructions, considered as a whole,
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no
error has been committed.” Id. (quotations, citation and brackets omitted).
When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, an appellate court
will only review the instruction for fundamental error.

State v. Adamcik,

152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson,
145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010)). To prove fundamental error, the defendant
must demonstrate: “(1) the alleged error violated an unwaived constitutional
right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the alleged error was not
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harmless.” Id. at 473, 272 P.3d at 445 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d
at 980).
C.

Bullock Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The
Jury Instructions
In order for Bullock to be guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery of

Jennifer Logan, the state was required to prove that Bullock assisted in the
commission of the offense with the intent to take Jennifer’s property by use of
force or fear and to permanently deprive her of her property. I.C. §§ 18-204, 186501; State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209, 1214
(Ct. App. 2003); State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 484, 487, 988 P.2d 710, 713
(Ct. App. 1999). Consistent with the applicable statutes, and with the pattern jury
instructions on aiding and abetting (see ICJI 311 and 312), the district court
instructed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting robbery, as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count Three:
Robbery, the State must prove each of the following:
1.
On or about June 24, 2015
2.
in the State of Idaho
3.
Jennifer Wall, also known as Jennifer Logan, had
possession of personal property,
4.
which the defendant Levie Raymond Bullock aided,
abetted, assisted or helped in taking the property from her person
or from her immediate presence,
5.
against her will,
6.
by the intentional use of force or fear to overcome her
will, and
7.
with the intent permanently to [sic] deprive her of the
property.
If any of the above has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each
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of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.142.) The court also gave the following definitional instruction:
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly
participates in the acts constituting a crime and a person who,
either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, assists,
facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps
or hires another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist
in its commission. Both can be found guilty of the crime. Mere
presence at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or
commission of a crime is not [in the absence of a duty to act]
sufficient to make one an accomplice.
(R., p.144.) The former instruction used language consistent with the pattern
instruction on aiding and abetting and complied with its directive that the
definition of aiding and abetting “should be incorporated into the instruction
stating the elements of the crime.” (Compare R., p.142 with ICJI 312.) The
latter instruction was a verbatim recitation of the pattern instruction defining
“aiders and abetters/principals” (compare R., p.144 with ICJI 311) and, as such,
was a presumptively correct statement of the law. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80,
85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Ruel, 141 Idaho 600,
602, 114 P.3d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2005)) (“The pattern ICJI instructions are
presumptively correct.”).
On appeal, Bullock concedes he did not object to the elements
instructions below. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.) Nevertheless, he contends he
is entitled to relief under the fundamental error doctrine because, he asserts, “the
jury was [not] properly instructed on the mental state necessary for liability under
an aiding/abetting theory.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) Specifically, he contends
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the instructions were erroneous because they did not include the precise
language set forth in one of the comments to ICJI 312 (but not in the language of
the pattern instruction itself) that “the mental state required for aiding and
abetting ‘is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense—the
aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and there must
[be] a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.’” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.13, 15 (quoting Comment to ICJI 312 which, in turn, cites State v. Scroggins,
110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985)).) The state acknowledges the quoted
language is a correct statement of the law. Contrary to Bullock’s assertions,
however, the trial court was not required to include a verbatim recitation of the
quoted language in its instructions because the instructions, as given, accurately
stated the law on the mental state element of aiding and abetting robbery.
Bullock has failed to show any error, much less fundamental error, that would
entitle him to relief.
“A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all
matters of law necessary for the jury’s information.”

State v. Severson,

147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132). “This
necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime
charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has
been admitted.’” Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922
(Ct. App. 2004)).

As noted above, the trial court in this case specifically

instructed the jury that, in order to be guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery of
Jennifer Logan, Bullock must have “aided, abetted, assisted or helped in taking”
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Jennifer’s property, “against her will,” “by the intentional use of force or fear to
overcome her will, and … with the intent permanently to [sic] deprive her of the
property.” (R., p.142 (emphasis added).) This instruction accurately stated the
mental state element of aiding and abetting robbery and, on its face, conveyed
that Bullock could only be found guilty if the state proved that he, personally,
acted with the intent both to use force or fear to take Jennifer’s property and to
permanently deprive her of the property taken. Even if the elements instruction
did not alone make clear that Bullock must have “shared the criminal intent” of
the principals and “acted with a community of purpose in the unlawful
undertaking,” the definition of aider and abettors/principals set forth in Instruction
No. 18 did.

(See R., p.144 (instructing that accomplice is someone who

“intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits,
invites, helps or hires another to commit a crime with the intent to promote or
assist in its commission” and that “[m]ere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent
consent to, the planning or commission of a crime is not … sufficient” (emphasis
added)).) Because the instructions as a whole accurately set forth the mental
state element of aiding and abetting robbery, Bullock has failed to show that the
trial court erred by not further instructing the jury using the specific language
from Scroggins and the comment to ICJI 312.
As support for his claim that the district court plainly erred by not giving
the jury a “specific instruction” based on Scroggins and the comment to ICJI 312,
Bullock relies on State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 253 P.3d 754 (Ct. App. 2011).
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) Reid was convicted of two counts of aiding and
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abetting first degree murder. Reid, 151 Idaho at 82-83, 253 P.3d at 756-57.
Like Bullock, Reid argued on appeal that the trial court committed fundamental
error because its elements instructions omitted the requirement that Reid share
the mental state of the principal, Kienholz. Id. at 83, 253 P.3d at 757. The Idaho
Court of Appeals rejected Reid’s argument, noting the “jury instructions were
appropriate under Scroggins” and, “[w]hether required or not, the jury was, in
fact, told in Instruction 24 that the State must prove that Reid shared Kienholz’s
mental state by requiring Reid to have ‘shar[ed] the criminal intent’ of Kienholz
such that Reid and Kienholz had a ‘community of purpose in the unlawful
undertaking.’” Id. at 86, 253 P.3d at 760 (emphasis added).
Bullock’s reliance on Reid for the proposition that the district court was
required to instruct the jury using the specific “shared criminal intent” and
“community of purpose” language articulated in the comment to ICJI 312 and
Scroggins is clearly misguided.

Although the Reid Court held that such an

instruction is a correct statement of the law, it did not hold that such an
instruction is mandated in every aiding and abetting case. Rather, the Court
discussed the instruction in the context of addressing Reid’s claim that the jury
instructions omitted the requirement that Reid share the mental state of the
principal, and the Court rejected that claim because, “[w]hether required or not,
the jury was, in fact,” so instructed. Reid, 151 Idaho at 86, 253 P.3d at 760.
Notably, the Reid Court found that other instructions given in the case not only
“embodie[d] the articulation of criminal intent under the applicable law,” but also
admonished that Reid could only be found guilty “if he ‘intentionally aids, assists,
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facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires
another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission.’” Id.
Considering the instructions in their totality, the Reid Court found the
“instructions were not erroneous, let alone plainly so.” Id.
Like the instructions at issue in Reid, the instructions in this case,
considered in their totality, “embodie[d] the articulation of criminal intent under
the applicable law” and permitted the jury to find Bullock guilty of aiding and
abetting robbery only if he intentionally assisted in the commission of the crime
with the intent to promote or assist in its commission. Because the instructions
effectively, if not explicitly, required the jury to find Bullock shared the criminal
intent of the principals and acted with a community of purpose, Bullock has failed
to show the instructions were erroneous, “let alone plainly so.” Reid, 151 Idaho
at 86, 253 P.3d at 760.

His claim of fundamental error in the instructions

therefore fails.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury’s verdict finding Bullock guilty of robbery.
DATED this day of 27th July, 2017.
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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